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Abstract
A perennial question in computer networks is where to
place functionality among components of a distributed
computer system. In data centers, one option is to move
all intelligence to the edge, essentially relegating switches
and middleboxes, regardless of their programmability,
to simple static routing policies. Another is to add more
intelligence to the middle of the network in the hopes that
it can handle any issue that arises.
This paper presents an architecture, called Volur, that
provides a third option by facilitating the co-existence
of an intelligent network with an intelligent edge. The
key architectural principle of Volur is predictability of the
network. We describe the key design requirements, and
show through case studies how our approach facilitates
more democratic innovation of all parts of the network.
We also demonstrate the practicality of our architecture
by describing how to implement the architecture on top
of existing hardware and by deploying a prototype on top
of a large production data center.
1 Introduction
A perennial question in computer networks is where
to place routing functionality among components of a
distributed computer system: whether it be at the end hosts
or in the network itself. In data centers in particular, the
research community has presented compelling arguments
for route control and visibility at both locations. Their
work has shown the importance of placement to critical
network properties like fault tolerance and load balancing.
Link/switch failure handling is a good example of the
complexities of this decision. One broad class of proposals
argues for giving the network the ability to detect and route
around failures [45, 28, 29]—in essence, they argue for
a smart network supporting a simple edge. When working
as intended, these systems are both fast and efficient at
handling failures; however, for a broad class of failures
(e.g., “silent” failures), the detection methods themselves
can fail, leaving end hosts with little-to-no visibility or
control of how their packets are handled in the network.
The other class argues for moving all failure handling
to the edge of the network, essentially relegating switches
and middleboxes to simple static routing policies [31],
i.e., a simple network controlled by a smart edge. In this
approach, fate sharing guarantees that no packet losses will
go unnoticed; however, this comes at the cost of the ability
to react to easily detectible failures quickly and locally—a
feature that is essential to high network availability.
This paper explores a third option: the co-existence of
an intelligent network with an intelligent edge. Even con-
straining ourselves to fault tolerance and load balancing,
certain problems within those domains are best imple-
mented in the former, while others are best implemented
at the latter—an ideal network architecture would allow
for both. To that end, we present a new data center network
architecture, Volur, that facilitates this interaction. In the
end, however, is not possible to allow all features at all
locations in the network (fine-grained load balancing, for
instance, relies on transient information that is typically
not externally visible). Instead, the goal of Volur is to
provide clear guidelines for where to implement features,
to detail the restrictions on those features, and to present
a framework to implement them in a conforming way.
The key architectural requirement of Volur is pre-
dictability of the network. Specifically, that switch
routing behavior should be externally predictable by the
trusted network-layer software running on the endpoints.
Predictability forms the contract between the network and
its end hosts; as long as routing decisions are predictable
and/or infrequent, switches are free to do as they wish. In
return, end hosts must allow for transient inaccuracies in
prediction. As an example, switches are allowed to locally
detect and reroute around failures as long as end hosts
eventually become informed of the new network state.
Our system, Volur, presents a prototype implementation
of predictable networking that is composed of three
components: (1) switches that route using predictable
functions of the packet’s header and switch configuration
state, (2) a network state service that disseminates any
required information to end hosts, and (3) a per-end host
path choice module that models network behavior. To
demonstrate its flexibility, we implement two end host
applications on top of Volur that utilize the predictability
of the network to locate failures and balance load in spite
of concurrent in-network functionality.
To demonstrate its feasibility in practice, we built Volur
network predictors for two different deployments: a large
production data center at Facebook with upwards of one
hundred thousand devices [4], and a smaller testbed. These
deployments span multiple switch ASICs in switches from
multiple vendors, and show that while switch functionality
can be complicated, it does not need to be complicated.
While we understand that not every network operator has
the necessary information to implement this approach
today, it is our hope that the benefits we show provide suf-
ficient incentives for future development in this direction.
Finally, to evaluate our architecture, we utilized the
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Figure 1: A canonical 3-level Folded-Clos topology. The three
levels include ToR, aggregation, and core switches. The high
path diversity of these networks has contributed to an array of
complex and opaque routing strategies.
aforementioned large production data center deployment;
a second, modestly-sized Cloudlab testbed; and an ns-3
packet-level simulated network. Using these testing en-
vironments, we show: (1) that our predictability-supported
end host failure handling system can locate non-fail-stop
failures with over 0.95 precision and 0.85 recall even if
there are multiple, diverse failures and even if not all hosts
participate in localization, and (2) that hosts can route
around those failures within a fraction of a second. We also
show for at least one network feature that is disallowed in
our architecture—fine-grained load balancing—end-host-
based design on our architecture approach state-of-the-art
in-network approaches like CONGA.
More specifically, we make the following contributions:
• We present the design and implementation of a
novel data center architecture, Volur, that facilitates
the co-existence of an intelligent network with an
intelligent edge through the contract of predictability.
• We introduce a system, Volur-FL, that leverages
predictability to implement extremely accurate and
fine-grained failure localization and rerouting in the
presence of relatively-complex network features.
• We also introduce a second system, Volur-LB, that
demonstrates both the flexibility of Volur and how to
emulate in-network features predictably.
• Finally, we demonstrate the practicality of Volur by
implementing a prototype that can accurately predict
and control path choice on unmodified switches in a
large-scale production data center.
2 Motivation
Today’s data center networks typically take the form
of a multi-rooted tree of switches like the one shown
in Fig. 1. One natural property of these tree topologies
is the presence of many paths between any two end
hosts. Routing protocols, which select the path to use for
any particular packet, are essential to both maintaining
network reliability and ensuring balanced load. These
protocols are often complex and opaque to end hosts.
Central to this ecosystem is ECMP, a switch-level
mechanism that randomly chooses among several options
a next hop for each flow. Other examples include Link
Aggregation Groups (LAGs), which operate similarly to
ECMP, but among point-to-point links rather than paths;
Resilient Hashing [6], which dictates ECMP behavior so
that flow assignment is stable even as links are brought
up or taken down; and more recently, in-network load
balancing like LocalFlow [38], DRILL [12], DLB [30],
and CONGA [2], which route based on transient workload
statistics. Recent proposals for increased programmability
of networks [5] only increase the potential for complexity
and opacity of routing.
2.1 The Case for End Host Control
In contrast to the current state of the network, the research
community has, over the years, made many compelling
arguments for end host visibility and/or control of routing.
Some have noted that, for some features, end hosts are
uniquely suited to solving a particular problem such as fail-
ure localization [19] or performance isolation [19]. Others
have noted that end host changes are easier to implement
and deploy compared to changes to the network [22, 40].
A classic example (and part of the original inspiration
for the end to end argument [37]) is the handling of packet
drops and their associated network failures. The opacity of
today’s routing protocols presents a significant challenge
to the identification and mitigation of these failures,
particularly when they evade traditional debugging tools
such as heartbeats (e.g., BFD [25] and BGP keepalives)
and switch drop counters. Examples of failures that are
not easily caught by traditional network features are:
• Partial failures: Some failures are stochastic in
nature [45]. Switches may not detect these as their
occasional heartbeats/keepalives can get (un)lucky and
miss the problem while application traffic will continue
to experience packet drops.
• Input-dependent failures: Some are not random, but in-
stead only affect particular flows [45, 1]. Here too, heart-
beats may not trigger the same routing path as the prob-
lematic traffic, and the switch may not notice the error.
• Silent failures: Finally, switch counters are sometimes
unreliable, leading to cases of silent failures that are not
reflected in any network statistic. For failures that are
not noticed by the switch itself (e.g., partial or input-
dependent) and are also not reflected in counters, de-
tection is extremely difficult. These are known to occur
and cause significant headache in practice [26, 45, 1].
It is because of the above classes of failures that end
hosts are often seen as an attractive location in which
to detect and handle failures. Researchers have also
presented many other use cases for visibility and control
of routing at the end host. Unfortunately, the opacity of
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today’s data center networks prevents this, limiting the
scope/deployment of such approaches.
2.2 The Case for Network Control
A natural reaction to the desire for end host control over
routing is to migrate the complexity of the network to the
edge. This approach is explored by several recent data
center networking proposals [19, 24, 40, 36]. Some of
these proposals let networks handle routing, but give end
hosts the ability to change paths on demand through an
IPv6 Flow Label or similar mechanism [40, 43]—a useful
workaround, but limited in the features it can support.
On the more extreme end of this spectrum are source
routing approaches like those proposed in [19] or [35].
These proposals successfully enable end hosts to perform
fine-grained failure detection and rerouting, but a naive
application of source routing to data centers surrenders
at least two crucial features:
• Fast failover: Easily-detectable failures like signal
loss on a link are more simply and quickly handled in
the network. In these cases, switches adjacent to the
failure are able to detect/reroute at timescales orders
of magnitude faster than the edge. This fast failover is
essential for achieving high network availability.
• Backward compatibility: Most current applications and
operating systems are designed to be agnostic to the
routing decisions of the network. While it is possible to
change all applications, OSes, and/or hypervisors, an
ideal solution would permit the use of legacy software.
3 Volur: A Predictable Network
In this paper, we explore the design of an architecture for
the peaceful co-existence of an intelligent network with
intelligent end hosts. The key architectural principle of our
work is predictability of the network as a method for inter-
operation. In this model, switches are free to implement a
wide range of routing techniques as long as they are exter-
nally predictable. End hosts are then free to implement any
functionality they wish on top of the predictable network.
More specifically, our requirement is that switches
route based only on the packet header and infrequently
changing configuration state. Compared to pure source
routing, prediction in this model is not always accurate.
The point of fast failover, for instance, is that the switches
know about and can react to failures faster than end hosts.
Immediately after a failure, the network may not operate
as end hosts expect. Instead, end hosts must tolerate a
small amount of inaccuracy in return for these features.
There are several challenges in making such a system
practical, which we list in Tab. 1. Thus, the primary
contribution of our work is to characterize what it takes to
design and implement a predictable network and to detail
...
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Figure 2: The primary components in Volur, our instantiation
of a predictable network. A logically centralized Volur Service
collects the current configuration of the network and disseminates
it to end hosts, which use it to predict paths. Predictions can be
used for many purposes, from locating failures to balancing load.
its benefits/limitations. Volur consists of three primary
components: switches that are predictable, a Volur service
that gathers and distributes the current state of switches,
and end hosts that use that state to predict routes. The
overall architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2.
3.1 A Predictable Switch
As mentioned, our primary design principle is simple to
state: switches should route only on the packet’s header
and infrequently changing configuration state. Note that
this restriction only applies to functions that affect the
packet’s path—features such as management, monitoring,
QoS, and queuing are all orthogonal.
3.1.1 A Simple Predictable Packet Pipeline
To see why our design principle is congruent with common-
case network features, we describe the implementation of
a predictable network router. Due to space constraints, we
limit our exposition to the subset of the pipeline necessary
for forwarding a simple Ethernet and IPv4 packet without
VLANs or tunneling. The switch we describe allows for
both fast failover and backward compatibility.
In Sec. 5.1, we go on to show that, not only can we build
a predictable switch, we can also configure some existing
switches to be predictable.
L2 processing. L2 processing is typically based purely on
table lookups. For instance, if the destination MAC of the
packet matches the switch’s MAC address, the packet will
continue to L3 processing. Otherwise, it will be switched
as a raw Ethernet frame (we omit those details).
Depends on: packet header and switch’s MAC address.
L3 processing. L3 processing is also based on table
lookups, but may require other features as well. The switch
begins by looking up the destination IP in its forwarding
table. The resulting entry may either point to an egress
port, multiple egress ports, or indicate that the packet
should be dropped. When there are multiple possible next
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Challenges Solution Section(s)
Is it possible and/or practical to predict network behavior? Some networks are already predictable. More generally, we
anticipate that the OpenFlow model may also apply here—if cus-
tomers value predictability, vendors will provide it as a feature.
3.1, 5.1
Is predictability compatible with dynamic switch behavior? For infrequently-changing behavior (e.g., failover), Volurdisseminates versioned network state to end hosts.
3.2
For frequently-changing behavior (e.g., load balancing), end
hosts can approximate current switch features.
4.2
How do we deal with unpredictable failures and other
inaccuracies in prediction?
End-hosts use versioned topology to sieve out reliable drop statis-
tics. Common-case consistent hashing limit routing changes.
4.1.1, 5.2.4
How do we defend against DDoS attacks that might be enabled
by end host path prediction/control?
Only convey topology to the end host trusted computing base.
A NAT can be used if extra protection is needed.
3.3
Table 1: A roadmap of key challenges in creating a predictable network and their solutions.
hops, as is often the case in Clos networks, the switch will
calculate a hash function over several subfields of each
packet’s header. The result of the hash function (modulo
the number of possible next hops) is used as an index into
the next hop table to determine the egress port.
ECMP has traditionally been considered unpredictable,
but for efficiency, modern ECMP implementations are
typically deterministic. For instance, it might hash over a
packet’s 5-tuple using simple functions like XOR, CRC, or
table lookups [23, 18, 9]. In practice, these hash functions
can be combined with hash seeds, preprocessing, bit shift-
ing, masks, and resilient hashing techniques to improve re-
sults in various situations [6], but all of the above functions
are predictable as long as changes are relatively infrequent.
Depends on: packet header, L3 forwarding table, multipath
table, and ECMP hash configuration.
Egress modifications. Finally, before the packet is sent
back out on the wire, the switch will update the src and
dst MAC addresses to correspond to the next L2 hop.
In addition, it will recalculate the TTL field and IP and
Ethernet checksums.
Depends on: switch’s MAC address, neighbor’s MAC
address, and packet header.
3.1.2 Other Network Routing Functions
The above discussion focuses on L3 forwarding in a
predictable switch: how to implement it and how to predict
it given the current state of the switch. ECMP is included
in the set of functions that can be made predictable in this
fashion. The same is true of most other forwarding func-
tionality, e.g., encapsulation, VLANs, and QoS. There are,
however, some switch routing features that cannot be made
predictable. These typically involve fine-grained load bal-
ancing, e.g., CONGA [2] and DRILL [12]. We can classify
functions into these two categories based on their inputs:
Infrequently changing state: If, in addition to the
packet header, the switch routing algorithm depends only
on infrequently-changing state, it is considered to be
predictable in our model. As an example, in L3 routing,
failures and routing updates can cause unpredictable
changes in the network, but as long as the changes are
infrequent, end hosts network applications are expected
to handle those inaccuracies. The aforementioned
forwarding functionality falls squarely into this category,
as do many recent data center routing proposals including
WCMP [44], F10 [29], B4 [21], and SWAN [17]
Frequently changing state: If, on the other hand, the
switch routing algorithm depends on frequently changing
state such as instantaneous queue length or utilization,
the function is considered unpredictable. The cutoff
for frequency is determined by the operator and is a
function of the accuracy requirements of route prediction.
Examples of algorithms in this category include DLB [30],
CONGA [2], DRILL [12], and LocalFlow [38]—all
proposals for fine-grained, in-network load balancing.
They also include certain counter-based ACL, QoS, and
packet processing policies found on modern switches.
These functions are disallowed in Volur switches, but in
Sec. 4.2 we explore the efficient and accurate end host
emulation of this class of proposals.
3.2 The Volur Service
Predicting the route of a packet requires both the packet’s
header and elements of the switch’s current state. For
the sender of the packet, obtaining its header is simple.
For the other piece of information—switch state—we
introduce an aggregation service that gathers up-to-date
state from every switch and disseminates it to every end
host. This dissemination must be performed on any switch
state change including link failures/recoveries and control
plane routing updates. Replication and sharding of such
a service is straightforward; for ease of explanation, we
assume a logically centralized Volur service.
The primary goal of the Volur service is to disseminate
switch updates as quickly as possible. There are two steps:
Switches to the Volur service. As state updates may
occur at irregular intervals and must be disseminated
quickly, switches mostly operate on a push model. When
a state change occurs (e.g., a BGP update or link failure),
switches will immediately send a diff of their state to
the Volur service. The service also periodically pings each
switch for a hash of their current state to ensure that it is
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Figure 3: End hosts classify traffic into three classes given a state
update at time tu: pre-update, mid-update, and post-update.
still alive and correctly synchronized. In systems with an
existing centralized SDN infrastructure, the Volur service
is a natural extension to the SDN controller.
Volur service to end hosts. The second step is to
disseminate the state changes to end hosts. There are
two channels for state dissemination in our system. The
end hosts periodically pull a full snapshot of the current
network state. In addition, the Volur service broadcasts
versioned, perishable state updates to end hosts. These
updates are sent using UDP to ensure time bounds.
1. When a switch updates its state, it sends a diff of the
state change to the Volur service. Let the maximum
propagation delay of this message be t1.
2. Upon receipt of the update, Volur increments its
version number v→ v+1 and distributes the update
to all affected hosts. Let the maximum delay of this
message be t2.
3. Upon receipt of an update from the Volur service,
hosts send back an acknowledgment.
4. If the ACK is not received after some predetermined
timeout, inform the end host during its next checkpoint.
Given the above protocol, we can quantify the length of
three distinct phases of prediction accuracy. Assume that
the end host receives an update at time t, as shown in Fig. 3.
Pre-change predictions (before t− (t1 + t2)) are correct.
Mid-update predictions are slightly uncertain in that they
can follow either state v or v+1. This period lasts from
t−(t1+t2) to t. Post-update predictions starting from time
t should all follow version v+1. If the end host, during
a checkpoint, finds out that it failed to acknowledge an
update, all predictions between the current checkpoint and
the last one are potentially inaccurate. All inaccuracies
are handled by higher-level network applications.
3.3 End Hosts
Given a predictable network, end host operation is
relatively straightforward. We provide to each end host
a switch predictor that takes a switch state object and an
input packet header. The output of the predictor is a next
hop and output packet header.
Predicting a packet’s path. For every packet, path
prediction is just a matter of iteratively chaining the next
hop and packet header predictions of each intervening
switch. The switch state object is obtained from the Volur
service as described above; the end hosts already have the
initial packet header.
Controlling a packet’s path. To control a packet’s path,
end hosts only need to find a packet header that maps onto a
target/acceptable round-trip path. As switch operations are
typically not cryptographically secure, it is often possible
to create an efficient inverse for them. In Sec. 5.1, we show
that such techniques can be used to generate headers for
specific paths in our large production data center network
in under 12µs. Solutions are not guaranteed to exist, but
operators work hard to ensure that hash functions cover
the entire network evenly.
End hosts have at least a few options when trying to
craft a header to hit one of n paths. In general, they need
∼ dlogne bits that are otherwise unused by the network.
For instance: IPv6 flow labels (20 bits) are intended for
purposes like ours; port numbers (up to 32 bits) can also be
used, but in the case of source ports, this may require minor
OS changes in the way ports are allocated; and finally,
IP addresses (up to 64/256 bits) are possible as well, for
instance by giving each server a /24 or /120. End hosts can
also combine bit regions to obtain a larger ‘address space’.
Legacy hosts can continue to send packets without
modification, and those packets will be load balanced with
ECMP just as they are today.
Preventing malicious control of paths. As a corollary,
our architecture allows for efficient defenses against
DDoS attacks. A potential concern with our system is that
it may allow malicious users in multi-tenant data centers to
launch a targeted DDoS attack against individual network
elements. To that end, we note that without up-to-date
switch state, the network is not more predictable than
it is today—the configuration state space is very large
and constantly changing. Further, because cluster and
fabric switches and links have extremely high capacity,
it would be difficult for the attacker to determine whether
any particular trial succeeded at steering to a particular
path without access to data center internal traceroute.
Thus, the Volur service only distributes state to the trusted
computing base, and not untrusted applications/VMs.
Even so, if more security is necessary, the VM layer can
pick a random source port or flow label for each connection,
similar to the NATs that many VMMs already use. If even a
small part of the header is randomized, steering is difficult.
Changing paths mid-connection. Beyond controlling
a single packet’s path is controlling the path of an entire
TCP connection. For new connections, this is just a matter
of choosing a suitable 5-tuple for the connection. To
reroute existing connections to avoid a failed or congested
network component, Volur must change the packet headers
without disrupting TCP’s ability to demultiplex traffic.
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IPv6 flow labels are a good candidate for this. Otherwise,
e.g., in the case of TCP source ports, the VMM/OS may
need to rewrite the packet headers.
To be more concrete about this second option, when
Alice wishes to change the path of a connection with Bob,
she might decide on a TCP source port, s, that results
in the target forward and reverse paths. Alice will send
the new source port to Bob asynchronously in a separate
connection. This must be done out-of-band because in
the case of a failed path, the original connection may not
be usable. When Bob acknowledges the new source port,
Alice installs packet rewrite rules as follows:
• Egress: Alice overwrites the src port number with s.
• Ingress: Alice remembers the original src port number
in a hash table so that when a response comes in, she
can insert the original port transparently.
Bob installs similar rewrite rules:
• Egress: Bob overwrites the dst port number with s.
• Ingress: Bob remembers the original dst port number
in a hash table so that when a response comes in, he
can insert the original port transparently.
Both ends of the connection can initiate such a path
change, but to prevent flapping, we designate the client that
calledconnect() to be responsible for most path changes.
4 Case Studies
Predictability provides a rich interface for end hosts, and
we show two uses of that predictability. The first is a fault
localization service that showcases the flexibility of end
hosts in Volur despite static load balancing and failure
reaction in the network. The second is a load balancing
mechanism that simultaneously demonstrates the power
of our approach and shows how to emulate state-of-the-art
dynamic network behavior predictably.
4.1 Volur-FL: Fault Localization
The goal of Volur-FL is attribute packet drops to specific
components. At a high level, we model the fault local-
ization problem as an optimization problem [27, 32].
The intuition is that if many lossy paths from many
vantage points across the data center converge at a single
component, we can implicate the component as possibly
faulty. We show how careful accounting and analysis can
overcome any inaccuracies that may arise from concurrent
network changes.
4.1.1 Collecting Drop Statistics
Volur-FL first collects drop statistics for each path. For
TCP traffic (the majority of data center traffic), drop
information is already readily available in the form of
retransmission statistics. Volur-FL uses Linux eBPF
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Figure 4: Two flows (denoted by blue and red arrows) in a simple
topology and how Volur views the interactions between the flow
and the underlying components. Both flows start at the middle
server and traverse L2. The blue flow takes L1 while the red flow
takes L2. From the interactions, if only the blue flow sees abnor-
mal drops, L1 is probably faulty. Likewise for the red flow and L3.
(Extended Berkeley Packet Filters) [8] to gather these
statistics on a per-connection basis.
Specifically, we track two TCP variables: pktsSent, the
number of packets sent and pktsRetrans, the number of
packets retransmitted. Hosts poll these statistics every
10 s. Note that these variables track control packets that
are ACKed (e.g., SYN/FIN packets) in addition to data
packets. It is important to track control packets since, for
black holes, no data packets will be sent, only SYNs. These
statistics are approximations of the ground truth as in-flight
packets, cumulative ACKs, and spurious retransmits can
affect these numbers; however, our evaluations show that
this approximation is effective in practice.
Non-TCP traffic is slightly more complex as not
all protocols acknowledge packet receipt (e.g., UDP).
For them to be used in fault localization, they must be
extended with simple ACK packets or some other type of
coordination to detect when traffic is dropped; the ACKs
do not need to be used for any other purpose. The rest of
this paper assumes TCP traffic.
End hosts attribute the drops to paths as described
in the preceding section. To handle uncertainty during
the mid-update period, they evenly attribute drops to all
applicable predictions. For example, suppose that a single
TCP connection has 100 packets. If there are two possible
versions, we attribute 50 packets to each path. If there are
four, we attribute 25.
4.1.2 Implicating Components
Volur-FL uses path drop statistics to then implicate faulty
components. This step can be viewed as a classic inference
problem: given observed drops, we infer drop rate for each
component and then flag them as faulty if the rate is high.
System model. We model the impact of failures with a di-
rected bipartite graph (Fig. 4). The top partition consists of
various network components. We focus on links, switches,
and routing table entries (RTEs), which are among the most
common network failure granularities. The bottom parti-
tion consists of paths and their drop statistics. A component
has an edge to a path if the path contains the component.
In this model, each path i is observed to have transmitted
Ti and dropped Di packets, and each component j has an
unknown loss rate x j we want to infer. We assume drops
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are independent for simplicity. Our goal is to find loss rate
for all components such that the sum of mis-predicted
drops over all paths L(~x) is minimized.
L(~x)= ∑
i∈ all paths
∣∣∣∣∣Di−Ti ∑j∈Path(i)x j
∣∣∣∣∣ (1)
This formulation results in an estimated loss rate for
every component, xˆ j, rather than a binary up/down deter-
mination. If any loss rate is above an operator-specified
threshold, it is flagged as a possible failure. Though our
model is relatively simple, it can be extended to handle
additional component types or failure patterns through the
same inference framework.
Localization Algorithm. Finding component loss rates~x
that minimize L(~x) is a multivariate optimization problem.
We solve it using ideas from coordinate descent [41].
Specifically, we initialize all components with zero loss
rate, and greedily find the component loss rate x j that
minimizes L in isolation. This process is iterative.
There are a few properties that our algorithm must
satisfy in order to be practical. First, it must handle the
fact that retransmits can be caused by drops on both
the forward and reverse path, with no reliable way to
differentiate between the two. This is complicated by the
fact that cumulative ACKs mean that drops on the reverse
path are less likely to cause retransmissions than drops
on the forward path. Second, even if ACKs were accurate,
drops may occur due to congestion and attribution can be
inaccurate. Finally, the algorithm must be able to compute
the component loss rates very efficiently.
To address the difference between the forward and
reverse path, we consider the two halves separately. Note
that the reverse path can be predicted from headers by
swapping the source and destination addresses/ports.
When calculating the optimal drop rate for a particular
component, we conservatively consider only forward paths
as congestion statistics on them are much more accurate.
However, after we greedily choose the component that
minimizes L, its drop rate can be used to explain drops of
flows that cross it in either direction. Assuming sufficiently
diverse traffic, all paths should be covered by some
connection’s forward path.
The other challenges are handled by the procedure:
1. Initialize S to be the set of all components, and set the
drop rate x j =0,∀ j∈S.
2. For each j in S, consider all forward paths it touches, i∈
FwdPaths( j). Find the loss rate for the component, xˆ j,
that minimizes L assuming all other xk are unchanged:
xˆ j =argmin
x
∑
i
∣∣∣∣∣Di−Ti
(
x+∑
k 6= j
xk
)∣∣∣∣∣ (2)
Note that computing this step is very efficient. Because
∑i|Di−Tix| is piecewise linear, we only need to check
values of x that make one of those terms inside the
summation |Di − Tix| = 0. Further, the function is
convex, implying that a binary search can find the
global minimum.
3. Given the candidate xˆ j for all j∈S, pick the component
j′ that minimizes L and fix its drop rate x j′= xˆ j′ .
4. Remove all explained drops from FwdPaths( j′) ∪
RvsPaths( j′) and remove j′ from S.
5. If some paths have unexplained drops above threshold
and max iteration not yet reached, repeat from step 2.
4.2 Volur-LB: Load Balancing
The second application we explore, Volur-LB, demon-
strates the emulation of in-network load balancing
(specifically, CONGA [2]) in a Volur architecture. We note
that dynamic load balancing is a well-studied area with
many other proposals implemented at both the end host
and in the network. The choice of protocols is therefore
not an endorsement, but instead an opportunity to study
the Volur-friendly emulation of a routing algorithm with
“frequently changing inputs” as defined in Sec. 3.1.2.
At a high level, CONGA switches perform two functions.
First, they tag passing packets with congestion metrics and
feed that information back to the source ToR. Second, the
source ToR waits for a sufficiently long inter-packet gap,
rerouting each flowlet toward the least-congested path. In
Volur-LB, we separate these two functions explicitly and
offload the second (flowlet rerouting) to end hosts.
4.2.1 Collecting Congestion Metrics
Like CONGA, Volur-LB gathers congestion metrics via
in-band feedback. As a packet travels from the source to
the destination ToR, switches tag the packet with their
current load if it is larger than previously tagged values
(see [2] for details). The destination ToR then feeds these
path-level congestion metrics back to the source ToR
by piggybacking the information on normal traffic. For
every feedback-carrying packet, the destination ToR sends
a single path-level metric, choosing amongst them in
round-robin fashion.
At the end of the above process, the source ToRs
have a lowest-utilized path toward every destination
(multiple in the case of ties). In addition, as none of these
operations affect routing, they can all be done without
losing predictability.
Where we begin to differ from CONGA is with an extra
step to transfer the congestion metrics to servers in the
source rack. Volur-LB uses two mechanisms. First, the
ToR switch uses incoming traffic to the rack to opportunis-
tically piggyback the congestion metrics to its member
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servers. For every packet sent to a member server, the
ToR switch tags it in its egress pipeline with a (destination
rack, best path to the rack) tuple. The destination rack is
chosen in a round-robin fashion, and if there are multiple
best paths, a hash of the packet header is used to break
tie. In theory, congestion metrics kept at servers would
be less up-to-date compared to what their ToR switches
maintain. However, for servers that communicate often
with others, their congestion metrics would be refreshed
timely by incoming ACKs or data packets. The second
mechanism allows servers to query their ToR for the best
path to a destination leaf using UDP packets. Servers send
those requests to ToRs at connection setup in parallel with
their SYN packets. The on-demand query allows servers
to steer to good default paths after long silence.
4.2.2 Flowlet Steering
In parallel with congestion metric collection, end hosts
in Volur-LB monitor inter-packet spacing to detect
flowlets [40]. For every new flowlet, the server steers the
flowlet toward the destination’s last ‘best path’. Since
end hosts know when and where flowlets are rerouted,
predictability is maintained. Extension of Volur-FL to
flowlets instead of flows is straightforward.
Our approach maintains the metrics and features of
CONGA with minimal extra overhead (some additional
header data on ToR-server packets). Pushing the decision
to servers increases the latency of feedback and decreases
the rate at which feedback arrives at the decision point, but
per our evaluation in Sec. 5.3, the effects are negligible.
5 Evaluation
We leverage a few evaluation platforms. To evaluate the fea-
sibility of predictable networks we implement one on top
of a large data center at Facebook. To test the performance
of failure localization in a more controllable environment,
we use an 80-machine Cloudlab testbed. Finally, to test the
relative performance of Volur-LB and CONGA, we simu-
late the necessary hardware changes in ns-3. We show that:
• Some of today’s networks are already predictable with-
out modifying hardware or nonparticipating end hosts.
• Volur-FL is effective in locating a diverse set of failures
and is robust to topology updates.
• Volur-LB can closely approximate the performance of
state-of-the-art in-network approaches.
5.1 Feasibility of Volur
We begin by demonstrating the feasibility of prediction us-
ing a prototype implementation of Volur on a large produc-
tion data center at Facebook. The data center has upwards
of one hundred thousand devices and hosts a variety of ap-
plications, from frontend web servers and caching to back-
end storage and data analytics [4]. For the most part, servers
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Figure 5: CDF of the time it takes to compute a header for a
specific path. The topology we use is a fully-deployed version
of a recently published data center architecture [4].
are connected into the network with a single 10 Gbps link,
while interconnect switches use 40 Gbps links.
All of the switches are based on chipsets from one
of the biggest manufacturers of switch ASICs, but span
multiple vendors. These switches support a diverse set
of configurations for routing. Just for ECMP, the options
included flexible field selection, hash seeds, pre- and
post-processing steps, and many possible hash functions.
Our predictor faithfully reproduced the path computation
pipeline of these switches along with the effects of all of
these configuration options. It gathered the options from
switches in order to perform predictions.
Our prototype did not require any modifications to either
switch configurations or OS configurations—the network,
as configured, already approximated a predictable network.
We also verified the feasibility of our system on top of a
testbed of Cavium switches and ASICs, but we omit those
results here due to space constraint.
5.1.1 Predicting Paths
To test the accuracy of our predictor, we ran UDP tracer-
outes between servers in the data center, and compared
ground truths with our path prediction engine. The ToR
switch was already configured with an ECMP group.
When replicating the relevant configuration options within
our path deduction engine, we are able to replicate 100%
of the results recorded by the UDP traceroute experiment.
We also built the predictor’s inverse for the purpose of
efficiently generating headers for a target path.
Overhead of prediction. In addition to verifying that our
prediction engine can accurately predict paths, we also
tested the efficiency of the engine when trying to find a
header for a particular network path. For this experiment,
we chose a fixed source and destination server in the data
center. There were hundreds of potential paths between
the two machines through a topology similar to the one
described in [4]. As our inverse function is only able
to reverse a single switch’s routing function at a time,
generating a header for a specific multi-hop path involved
a multi-step process. The first step is to use the inverse
function to generate a valid header for one of the switches
(with a preference for the switch with the largest ECMP
group). We then use our predictor to check the generated
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Figure 6: Throughput of a constant-rate connection in the
presence of a failure. Upon TCP timeout, the sender transparently
switches paths. The post-failure spike was due to a rush of ACKs.
header on the second switch. If the header maps to the
correct routing choice and does not require a reserved port,
we accept the header, otherwise, we start again.
Fig. 5 shows a CDF of the execution time of the above
algorithm on a server with a 2.60 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2670.
For the test, we picked a specific path and gave the
generator control over the UDP source port of the header
We then tracked the time it took to find a target header for
the given path. The algorithm was always able to find a
valid header with a median execution time of 3.4µs.
5.1.2 Controlling Paths
To demonstrate path control, we implemented and
deployed to a small set of nodes in the aforementioned
data center an iptables user-space application called
‘ECMP-interpose’. ECMP-interpose automatically and
transparently modifies connection parameters when a TCP
timeout occurs. Modifications are as described in Sec. 3.3.
More concretely, ECMP-interpose installs rules into
iptables that match on relevant incoming and outgoing
TCP traffic and relay packets via the NFQUEUE target to
a user-level packet queue. For each connection, we install
rules matching the TCP source port into the INPUT and
OUTPUT chains in the filter table on both end hosts as
described previously. iptables allows rules for several
connections to be consolidated via range and set matches
for performance. After modification, it computes the new
TCP checksum and relays packets back to the kernel.
Effect of rerouting. We evaluate our prototype with a
simple rerouting experiment. We run a constant-rate TCP
connection from a source to a destination in a different
cluster in the same data center. At ∼2 seconds, we fail
the connection. When the sender gets a timeout (via
tcp retransmit timer() in the Linux networking
stack), ECMP-interpose automatically switches to an
alternate path. While the timeout took∼500 ms, ECMP-
interpose’s switchover was nearly instantaneous—a
more aggressive failure detection method would have
minimized interruption of connectivity. We conclude that
we can successfully and transparently and selectively
change ECMP routes of live connections by interposing
on these connections and modifying their port numbers.
Route changes are instant and stable.
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Figure 7: Precision and recall for a single failure and various
drop rates from 1% to 100%. We considered link failures, switch
failures, and failures of individual routing table entries over a
window of 10 s.
5.2 Volur-FL Evaluation
We evaluate Volur-FL by asking several questions:
• Can we localize different types of failures and how
sensitive is our approach to the failure’s drop rate?
• How much does the aggregation period length matter?
• What about multiple, potentially heterogeneous faults?
• How much does a stale view of topology affect results?
Testbed. We answer these questions using an 80-machine
Cloudlab [34] testbed. The machines were interconnected
via a 10 Gbps network. Each physical machine emulates
either a server or a predictable software switch. We use
GRE-tunnel [20] to implement an overlay Clos network.
The resulting topology has 12 racks with 4 servers
each. The racks’ 12 ToRs are split into 3 clusters with 4
aggregation switches in each. Each aggregation switch
connects to two core switches, for a total of 8 core switches.
We use Linux tc to limit link bandwidth to 1 Gbps, and
emulate RED queues with ECN marking threshold at
30 KB [3]. We configure Linux to use DCTCP.
To collect drop statistics, we use Linux eBPF [8] with
bcc [13]. Unless stated otherwise, drop statistics were
polled every 10 seconds. We use recall and precision, av-
eraged over 50 runs, as metric for fault localization. Recall
is the percentage of faults that have been predicted and
precision is the percentage of predictions that are correct.
Workload. We generate traffic according to a realistic
workload based on empirically observed traffic patterns
in deployed data centers [3]. The web search workload
is heavy-tailed: a small fraction of flows contribute most
of the traffic. Flows arrive according to a Poisson process
between server pairs evenly. We inject an offered load of
40% of total host access link bandwidth.
Failures. We injected failures into the network at random
time while running our failure localization application in
the background. The set of failures we tested were drawn
from those emphasized by recent literature [29, 45, 42]
and they cover the range of failure behaviors listed in
Sec. 2.1. In particular, several types of components can
fail silently in our testbed: links, switches, and individual
routing table entries. Failures can either be fail-stop or
stochastic with some drop rate.
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Figure 8: Precision and recall for detecting a 0.1% failure over
a range of aggregation periods.
5.2.1 Localization of a Single Failure
We first evaluate our localization precision and recall for a
single failure. We inject failures at either a link, switch, or
routing table entry, at random location. We tested various
drop rates ranging from 1% to 100%. The mean time from
failure to end host notification was 21.8 seconds (much
of this was due to our use of a 10 s aggregation period).
Fig. 7 shows that, for most cases, our algorithm has
perfect precision and recall. This is because greedy is
optimal when there is only a single instance of failure.
5.2.2 Effect of Aggregation Period Length
Lower-rate failures can be detected by increasing the
aggregation period. This represents a tradeoff. A longer
aggregation period can filter out transient noise from
the data, making our predictions more accurate, and
also decrease the overhead of collection. This, however,
increases failure detection latency.
Up until now, we have been using a 10 seconds aggre-
gation period. In this experiment, we test how long the
aggregation period needs to be to detect a 0.1% loss rate
link failure. In principle, any persistent failure with loss rate
greater than the steady-state congestion loss rate of the net-
work can be located with a long enough aggregation period.
In Fig. 8, we show the precision and recall for windows
ranging from 20 s to 60 s. As we aggregate over longer
period, detection becomes more accurate, reaching 90%
precision and recall for 0.1% loss rate with a 60 second
aggregation period.
5.2.3 Multiple, Simultaneous Failures
Volur-FL also extends to multiple simultaneous, possibly
heterogeneous, failures. We injected a random mix of fail-
ures and look at the precision and recall for our algorithm.
The failures are randomly chosen: they can be link failures,
switch failures, or routing table corruptions. Their drop
rates are sampled uniformly between 1% and 100%.
Fig. 9 shows the average precision/recall for up to
10 simultaneous failures. Across the experiments, our
system maintains a precision above 0.95 and a recall
above 0.85, even when failure count is high. As the failure
count increases, recall decreases. This is expected as our
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Figure 9: Average precision and recall for simultaneous failures
in our testbed. The failures are of a random type and rate.
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Figure 10: The average precision and recall for detecting a 10%
switch failure in the presence of a topology change. With Volur
state dissemination, precision and recall increase to above 0.95
regardless of failover scheme (modn or resHash).
algorithm is greedy and assumes that a few larger failures
are more likely than many smaller failures.
5.2.4 Impact of Stale State
Part of Volur’s design is that switches can make routing
changes on-the-fly, as long as those changes are infrequent.
In this subsection, we evaluate the impact of stale state
on failure localization. More specifically, we try to
locate a single 10% drop rate failure in the presence of a
topology-changing switch reboot.
We first configure a random aggregation or core
switch to silently drop 10% of packets. Later, we
reboot a random aggregation switch, which is properly
detected/disseminated via the Volur service.
We evaluated two different switch failover policies
with and without state dissemination. The first policy,
‘modn’, remaps all flows using a simple modulo function.
The result is that most flows change paths after a failure.
The second, resilient hashing (‘resHash’), uses a simple,
predictable function that limits the number of flows that
need to change paths after a single failure.
Fig. 10 shows that without resilient hashing or topology
dissemination, precision and recall falls to around 0.5, with
successes limited to cases where the failures are in separate
subtrees and therefore most traffic is predicted correctly.
With resilient hashing, both numbers rise to 0.84 as re-
silient hashing avoids remapping every flow. Thus, a large
number of path predictions are still correct even with stale
network state. For both failover strategies, adding topology
dissemination brings precision and recall back above 0.95.
5.3 Volur-LB Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of Volur-LB with a 12-switch,
72-host ns-3 simulation. We show that Volur-LB achieves
an average flow completion time (FCT) within 1.05x of
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Figure 11: Volur-LB achieves almost identical FCT as CONGA
for symm topology and within 1.1x for asymm topology.
CONGA at low to moderate load, and within 1.1x at very
high load for both symmetric and asymmetric topologies.
Architecture. We used a 6-leaf 6-spine topology with
10 Gbps links and 2:1 leaf oversubscription ratio. In the
symmetric topology, all links have 10 Gbps capacity. In
the asymmetric topology, each leaf has 2 randomly picked
uplinks out of 6 uplinks with half capacity. In the worst
case, a leaf to leaf path can have 4 paths out of 6 paths with
only 5 Gbps capacity. The degree of asymmetry is high.
End hosts use DCTCP and queues use RED with
ECN marking, with a threshold of 65 MTU and 700 KB
(467 MTU) buffers [3].
Workload. We generated flows according to the enterprise
workload in [2, 40] with arrival rate to match different
offered traffic load. Traffic were generated using a simple
client-server program at each host. All traffic went
through the spine to stress the load balancing properties
of the fabric. Each client established 6 persistent TCP
connections with every server.
Methodology. We use flow completion time (FCT) as
evaluation metric. We average over 5 runs. We compare:
• ECMP: Our baseline is ECMP, in which each switch
makes local, uniform-random load balancing decisions.
• CONGA: We use the default parameters: Q = 3,
τ=160µs, and flowlet timeout of 500µs. We validated
our implementation with the testbed results from [2].
• Volur-LB: Finally, we implement Volur-LB as described
in Sec. 4.2. Where applicable, we use the same config-
uration parameters as our CONGA implementation.
Results. Fig. 11a shows that Volur-LB achieves almost
identical average FCT to CONGA on symmetric topology
for all load. Fig. 11b shows that Volur-LB achieves FCT
within 1.1x of CONGA on asymmetric topology even for
load as high as 80%.
6 Related Work
Over the years, the research community has pointed out
deficiencies in data center network routing, both in load
balancing and fault tolerance. Broadly speaking, proposed
solutions fall into one of three categories:
Network control. The network is a straightforward place
to address these deficiencies. For load balancing, systems
like CONGA [2] and DRILL [12] add functionality to
switches so that they can react to traffic bursts at very short
time scale. For failure localization, a similar trend has been
to augment in-network monitoring [7, 33, 10, 15, 45, 28]
Although these approaches are powerful, when the mech-
anisms themselves fail, end hosts are left with no recourse.
End host control. Another class of prior work attempts to
address deficiencies at the end host. A few of these propose
to either work around the network’s opacity or move bits
of routing functionality to the end hosts. In particular, Let-
Flow [40] and CLOVE [24] both make a case for end host
load balancing as do several other approaches [22, 16, 43].
The same is true of failure detection [1, 14]. Our work
is complementary to these systems as we seek to support
future routing innovation so that new proposals are not
hamstrung by ECMP’s interface.
More extreme are proposals like XPATH [19], which
argue for source routing in the data center. These give full
route control and visibility to the end hosts, but they come
at the cost of essential features like fast in-network failover.
Network and end host coordination. The idea of
an intelligent network assisting intelligent hosts has
been explored in other areas. For example, ECN-based
transport [3, 11] provides end hosts with information
about the utilization of the network.
In a similar vein, other proposals have sought to increase
visibility into the network by tagging packets with their
path as they pass switches [36, 39]. The caveat with
this approach is that locating failures with tags requires
successful delivery; if none of the target packets make it
through to the destination, the route will remain hidden.
In comparison, Volur provides end hosts with a complete
and up-to-date view of routing in the network, greatly ex-
panding the options for and efficacy of end host functions.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents an architecture that facilitates the
co-existence of route control both in the network and
at end hosts. Our results show that the architecture is
both feasible and flexible. Using it, we demonstrate a
failure handling mechanism that is both accurate and
responsive. We also demonstrate an end host load balanc-
ing mechanism that emulates state of the art in-network
approaches predictably. Finally, we verify the feasibility
of our approach by building a test deployment on a large,
otherwise unmodified production data center network.
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